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DAUBERT AND THE QUEST FOR VALUE-FREE
"SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE" IN THE COURTROOM*
Alexander Morgan Capron**
In a world that grows more technologically complex every day
and in which scientific research continually expands both our
understanding of, and our questions about, the operation of the
natural and man-made world, it is hardly surprising that sci-
ence should show up with increasing frequency in our court-
rooms. Science itself is sometimes at issue, for example, in
proceedings on allegations of scientific misconduct or in dis-
putes over the ownership or patentability of technologies. But
more frequently, science enters in aid of resolving a case in
which a complex question of causation is at issue. To establish
or rebut causation, each side may seek to introduce evidence
from expert witnesses.' With crowded dockets, the simpler cas-
es are more likely to settle, while more complex ones-especially
class actions and mass tort suits-go to trial, which may explain
* This article is a revised version of a presentation to a faculty colloquy,
February 16, 1995, during a visit as George E. Allen Professor at the University of
Richmond School of Law, and of a paper delivered at the David L. Bazelon
Conference in Science, Technology, and Law, at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School, April 1, 1994. I am grateful to the participants in both settings for their sug-
gestions, and particularly to Professor A. Leo Levin for his commentary, to Doris Lin
and Dean Grafos, University of Southern California, Law Class of 1996, and Joseph
A. DiMondi and Jeffrey J. Maurer, University of Southern California, Law Class of
1997, for research assistance, and to the Faculty Research Fund of the University of
Southern California Law School for support.
** Henry W. Bruce Professor of Law, University Professor of Law and Medicine,
and Co-Director, Pacific Center for Health Policy and Ethics, University of Southern
California.
1. Experts typically testify about how something (such as an injury) occurred,
but sometimes their causative explanation is forward looking-that is, the expert pro-
vides a theory of causation to justify or challenge a decision that rests on a predic-
tion of future outcomes. For example, a factory owner whose operations have been re-
stricted on the grounds that they create an unreasonable risk of environmental dam-
age might seek to demonstrate that the prediction of harm is not scientifically valid;
likewise, if a patient challenges a healthcare insurer's refusal to cover a particular
medical intervention that it deems to be "experimental," one issue at trial could be
whether the intervention has been shown reliably to produce a particular outcome.
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why in some jurisdictions, experts take part in upwards of
eighty percent of all trials.
Expert testimony raises many issues for the legal system.
Most broadly, to some observers science and the law seem to be
a bad fit; at least as idealized, their aims and methods are
radically different.2 Science is oriented toward the truth but its
claims are presented tentatively and are subject to refutation,
with an emphasis on the quality of the data rather than on
decision produced by an hierarchical structure. Although science
has its share of respected individuals and institutions, the ac-
ceptance or rejection of theories and data is supposed to depend
on the quality of the evidence and methodology, not solely on a
scientist's position in a hierarchy. In contrast, the law is orient-
ed toward the just resolution of cases rather than truth-finding;
verdicts must be rendered even when information is incomplete
(hence the acknowledged importance of presumptions and bur-
dens of proof), and each dispute rests within a particular hier-
archy in which there are established procedures for coming to a
single, definitive answer.
As the debate has heated up over science in the courtroom, a
great deal of attention has focused on the adequacy of judicial
processes to deal with disputes involving large quantities of
scientific evidence. Unlike the legislative and executive branch-
es, the judiciary has not had a reliable source of advice on
matters of science and technology. This raises many questions.
For example, in cases that involve substantial disputes about
scientific questions, would it be better to turn to alternative
dispute resolution rather than to long trials that tie up the
courts and leave the ultimate decision in the hands of lay ju-
rors who lack sufficient knowledge to sort out good scientific
claims from bad, and may be misled by irrelevant aspects of an
expert's presentation or appearance?3
2. See Margaret G. Farrell, Coping With Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special
Masters, 43 EMORY L.J. 927 (1994):
Science is essentially descriptive, positive and predictive. The goal is to
tell us what is and what will be in the future. Law, on the other hand,
is prescriptive and normative. The effort is to tell us what ought to be,
to define rules of conduct and responsibility grounded in events of the
past.
Id. at 942.
3. After carefully reviewing the transcripts of a number of the 30 Bendectin
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I. THE DAUBERT CASE
Beyond questions about the advisability of relying on the
judicial process, scientific experts also confront courts with
practical problems in deciding about their qualifications to testi-
fy, and the relevance of their evidence to the issues in conten-
tion. In a landmark 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' the Supreme Court reexamined the is-
sue of the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The plaintiffs in these cases were two young
children, Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller, who with their par-
ents filed suits against the manufacturer of Bendectin, a drug
prescribed to treat nausea and vomiting during pregnancy. The
boys sought damages for their limb reduction birth defects
which they contended were caused by their mothers having
taken Bendectin while they were in utero. The district court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that the plaintiffs had failed to sustain their burden of
establishing a genuine issue of material fact regarding causa-
tion.5 As summarized by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the trial court:
Plaintiffs' evidence of causation consisted primarily of
expert opinion based on in vitro and in vivo animal tests,
chemical structure analyses and the reanalysis of epidemio-
logical studies. Among the contrary evidence proffered by
Merrell Dow was the affidavit of a physician and epidemiol-
ogist who reviewed all of the available literature on the
subject, which included more than 30 published studies in-
volving over 130,000 patients, and concluded that no pub-
lished epidemiological study had demonstrated a statistical-
trials to date, and in light of the virtually uniform view of the judges in all the cases
that the evidence was insufficient to allow plaintiffs to collect even though 40% of the
jury verdicts had been in plaintiffs' favor, Joseph Sanders concluded:
[C]urrent litigation practices inevitably lead to situations in which juries
are unable to appropriately weigh the complex scientific evidence present-
ed at trial. As a result, trial verdicts and damages awards bear little
relation to the weight of scientific opinion.
Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence. The Testimony on Causation in the
Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 85 (1993).
4. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
5. Id. at 2792.
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ly significant association between Bendectin and birth de-
fects. Plaintiffs do not challenge this summary of the pub-
lished work.6
In the past fifteen years, thirty Bendectin cases have been
tried, primarily in the federal courts, and several have under-
gone appellate review focusing on the causation evidence that a
plaintiff would need to adduce. At the time of Daubert, three of
the four circuit courts had held that plaintiffs could not estab-
lish that Bendectin was responsible for their limb deformities in
the absence of epidemiologic studies that had either "been pub-
lished [or] subjected to the rigors of peer review."7 The trial
and appellate courts in Daubert took the same view and exclud-
ed all four categories of the plaintiffs evidence: first, the so-
called structure-activity studies (that the similarity of chemical
structure between ingredients in Bendectin and known
teratogens constitutes evidence that Bendectin causes birth
defects); second, the in vitro or animal cell experiments (that
the ingredients in Bendectin cause minor DNA damage to cells
in culture or inhibit limb bud cell differentiation, for example);
third, the in vivo or live animal research (in which pregnant
animals, such as rats, rabbits, and monkeys, are studied and
the defects seen in their fetuses are extrapolated to humans);
and fourth, reanalysis of the epidemiological data (in which
some of the reported instances of injury or noninjury following
use of the drug are reclassified, with the result that the corre-
lation between drug-usage and birth defects becomes statistical-
ly significant).8
These rulings on admissibility were based on two lines of
reasoning. First, the district and circuit courts held that absent
scientific understanding of the cause of the birth defects in
question, causation may only be shown through epidemiological
evidence.9 Second, both courts followed earlier appellate deci-
sions in refusing to allow the recalculated epidemiological data
6. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir.
1991) rev'd 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
7. Id. at 1130.
8. Id. at 1129.
9. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572, 575
(S.D. Cal. 1989), affd 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993);
Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1130.
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offered by plaintiffs experts, particularly Drs. Adrian Gross and
Alan K. Done, because (in the words of the District of Columbia
Circuit in Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell"0 ), unlike the
studies "rejected by [the plaintiffs' experts, which] had been
published in peer-reviewed scientific journals," the plaintiffs'
experts had "neither published [their] recalculations nor offered
them for review.""
This latter point-that the procedures followed by an expert
witness in reaching a conclusion must be those generally ac-
cepted as reliable among the scientific community-is usually
referred to as "the general acceptance standard" or "the Frye
test" because of the 1923 case Frye v. United States,12 in which
the District of Columbia Circuit articulated what became the
dominant gauge of the admissibility of novel scientific evidence:
"[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimo-
ny deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov-
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs." 3 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Daubert in order to decide whether this
seventy-year-old standard was superseded by the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Justice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court,
rejected the Frye test, not because he found fault in its "general
acceptance" rule (though that rule has had many detractors
over the years), but because he concluded that Congress, in
adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence twenty years ago, chose
not to incorporate Frye into the Rules.
The Court might have stopped there and vacated the Ninth
Circuit's judgment, which clearly rested on the latter court's
conclusion that findings which have not been "subjected to
verification and scrutiny by others in the field"'4 do not meet
the "general acceptance" requirement of Frye. Instead, Justice
10. 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 218 (1989).
11. See Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 573 (quoting Richardson, 857 F.2d at 831); see
also Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1131 (also citing Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 830 F.2d
1190 (1st Cir. 1987) and Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307,
modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989)).
12. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
13. Id. at 1014.
14. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1131.
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Blackmun construed the relevant Rules on expert evidence and
provided some "general observations" on new standards for the
admissibility of such evidence, a move that Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, criticized in a partial
dissent as an unwarranted expansion of the issue before the
Court. 15
II. WHAT STANDARD OF RELIABILITY Do THE RULES
ESTABLISH?
Justice Blackmun began his gloss on the Federal Rules of
Evidence by noting the very liberal standard that Rule 402
establishes in favor of admission of "all relevant evidence." 16 If
this were the only criterion, the points on which an expert
would testify would simply have to fit the facts of the case. For
example, the claim that Bendectin causes limb deformities in
15. "General observations' by this Court ... suffer from the flaw common to
most such observations-they are not applied to deciding whether or not particular
testimony was or was not admissible, and therefore they tend to be not only general,
but vague and abstract." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Although this article explores the problems with Justice
Blackmun's "general observations" and with their implications for the trial of cases
involving expert testimony, it is not obvious that the problems would have been
overcome had the Court waited, as the Chief Justice preferred, for the question to be
presented in a subsequent case. It is true that Justice Blackmun relied heavily on
the 22 amicus curiae briefs filed in Daubert to explore what the Chief Justice de-
scribed as "one or more bodies of knowledge not judicially noticeable, and subject to
different interpretations in the briefs of the parties and their amici," which largely
deal "with definitions of scientific knowledge, scientific method, scientific validity, and
peer review-in short, matters far afield from the expertise of judges" rather than
with "decided cases or statutory language-the sort of material we customarily inter-
pret." Id. Yet had the interpretation of the Federal Rules been left to a subsequent
case, it nevertheless seems likely that such questions as the meaning of "scientific
knowledge" would have become part of the case largely through arguments advanced
in briefs before trial upon motions to admit or exclude proffered experts and that the
same amici as appeared in Daubert would have filed the same briefs once the issue
went up on appeal. A different process of inquiry-and perhaps a different re-
sult-would be expected only if one thinks that the problems with the standard articu-
lated in Daubert flowed primarily from the absence of cross examination of those who
held the position adopted by Justice Blackmun. Since interpretations of the scientific
method that differ from the Court's were forcefully advanced in the case by some of
the amici, to say nothing of the defendants, it seems doubtful that the difficulty con-
fronting the Court-of grappling with "unusual subject matter" where its "reach can so
easily exceed [its] grasp"--would have been avoided had the Court waited for a later
case. Id.
16. FED. R. EVID. 402.
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children when their mothers take it during the first trimester
of pregnancy would be "relevant" and hence admissible once the
plaintiff had submitted evidence from which a jury could find
that the mother in the case at bar took the drug at that time
in her pregnancy.
But, in addition to the relevance requirement of Rule 402,
Rule 702 sets forth a further requirement for expert testimony.
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise."' Recognizing that expert
testimony can be both powerful and misleading, the Court re-
jected the notion that the rules disable judges from screening
"purportedly scientific evidence" and admitting only that which
they believe to be trustworthy. 8 Justice Blackmun found in
Rule 702 a "helpfulness" criterion, based on the rule's provision
that expert testimony regarding "scientific knowledge" is al-
lowed when it will "assist the trier of fact."' He concluded
that the term "scientific knowledge" implies adherence to scien-
tific methodology and support by "appropriate validation."20 In
footnote nine (which is likely to be the subject of a good deal of
commentary in the years to come), Justice Blackmun explained
that when scientific evidence is involved, "evidentiary reliability
will be based on scientific validity."2' In sum, the trial judge
must assess "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid" as well as being "proper-
ly... applied to the facts in issue."22
While the majority may have gone well beyond the language
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in creating its "scientific valid-
ity" criterion, some limitation on expert testimony is both neces-
sary and clearly intended by the Rules. The normative question
is thus: what values are implicit in the Court's conclusion that
admissible evidence must be scientifically valid? This inquiry
17. FED. R. Evm. 702.
18. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
19. Id. at 2794.
20. Id. at 2795.
21. Id. at 2795 n.9 (emphasis in original).
22. Id. at 2796.
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involves two levels of analysis: first, the content of the standard
for admissibility; and second, the way it allocates authority in
making that judgment.
A. What is "Scientific Knowledge"?
The Court explained that a 'key question" in deciding wheth-
er testimony qualifies as scientific knowledge is "whether it can
be (and has been) tested," or, in language the Court took from
Karl Popper, "its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability."'
Among scientists, such notions are commonplace, but they sim-
ply shift the inquiry back one step: what methods are accept-
able to "prove" or "disprove" a theory, and what evidence counts
in reaching a judgment by whom?24
Quoting a dictionary, Justice Blackmun stated that knowl-
edge, rather than being mere belief is "known facts" or ideas
"accepted as truths on good grounds."25 That this sounds suspi-
ciously like Frye's "generally accepted" test is not surprising,
since the commonplace idea is that science is whatever scien-
tists do.2"
23. Id. at 2797 (quoting KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE
GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)). A difficulty with this use of
Popper is that Blackmun seems to be answering a question that Popper explicitly
said he was not addressing. The quest under Daubert is for "scientific validity" as a
basis for evidentiary reliability, whereas at the beginning of the section that con-
cludes with the "falsifiability" passage Popper states:
The problem which troubled me at the time was neither, "When is a
theory true?" nor, "when is a theory acceptable?" My main problem was
different. I wished to distinguish between science and pseudo-science,
knowing very well that science often errs, and that pseudo-science may
happen to stumble on the truth.
KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWL-
EDGE 33 (1962) (emphasis in original). While courts must search for scientific validi-
ty, Popper was not concerned with a theory's validity: "neither the problem of truth,
... nor the problem of exactness or measurability." Id. at 34.
24. Modern theorists argue that falsification is socially constructed. "[W]hether a
methodology can falsify the conclusion will be determined by the standards, equip-
ment, measurement, and error rates agreed upon by those within the relevant scien-
tific community." Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.:
Epistemiology and Legal Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183, 2205 (1994).
25. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)).
26. Thus, Daubert's reliability analysis may just be another way of asking
whether the theories and methodologies in question have been reviewed using gener-
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Thus, rather than having scuttled Frye, the Daubert Court
has simply rejected equating "general acceptance" with peer
review and publication." Even so, whether a theory has been
subject to these processes is "pertinent," it is just no longer "a
sine qua non of admissibility."28 In support of this sensible
conclusion, the Court notes that on the one hand, publication
does not guarantee reliability, and on the other, some well-
grounded theories will not have been published. "Good sci-
ence" does, however, depend on some form of scrutiny and ac-
ceptance by "the scientific community."
30
ally accepted scientific methods. "Compliance with the Daubert factors only demon-
strates that the methodologies in question conform to the prevailing scientific para-
digms, constructed by the conventions of, and for the purposes of, specialized scientif-
ic communities." Farrell, supra note 24, at 2205.
27. State courts in ruling on the applicability of Daubert to state trials have
recognized this similarity. See Lindsey v. People, 892 P.2d 281, 292 n.23 (Colo. 1995)
(indicating the court's belief that "[d]espite the criticisms levelled at Frye, this stan-
dard is not far removed from evaluation required under FRE 702."); Commonwealth
v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) (explaining the court's reservations
about the application of Daubert: "We suspect that general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community will continue to be the significant, and often the only, issue.").
28. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. The fear that "general acceptance" would no
longer be considered an important criteria for determining the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence has prompted a number of states to reject the multi-factored analysis of
Daubert. See, e.g., People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994). Furthermore, even
states that have rejected Frye as the sole controlling test for determining admissi-
bility have stressed the importance of general acceptance in safeguarding reliability.
"If there is general acceptance in the relevant scientific community, the prospects are
high, but not certain, that the theory or process is reliable." Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d at
1348.
29. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
30. A recent law review Note attempts to supplement the guidance provided by
Daubert by arguing that its test of "scientific validity" requires "true peer review,"
described as "the collegial review of claims among peers in the scientific community"
and "the operational construct for scientific progress itself," which encompasses the
global discourse among scientists about claims that appear in the scientific literature
as a result of the narrower process of "editorial peer review." Effie J. Chan, Note,
The "Brave New World" of Daubert: True Peer Review, Editorial Peer Review, and
Scientific Validity, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 100 (1995). Chan argues that courts should
neither regard publication as an imprimatur of scientific legitimacy nor dismiss those
claims that have not survived the editorial review process, which itself encompasses
widely variant practices, subject to much individual, unsupervised, and even invisible
discretion, and which aims to produce articles that are original and important. "A
scientific study that could prove extremely valuable or even outcome-determinative in
litigation might be rejected for publication because it lacks originality of method or
broad significance." Id. at 121 (citing Brief Amici Curiae for the American Association
for the Advancement of Science and the National Academy of Sciences in Support of
Respondent, at 12, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786
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B. Decision by Judge, Jury, or Scientist?
The apparent simplicity of this conclusion may mask two
underlying issues of authority. Attention has mostly been di-
rected toward the first: within the courtroom, who should de-
cide whether the reasoning or methodology underlying expert
testimony is scientifically valid and can properly be applied to
the facts at issue? In civil cases, this comes down to a power
struggle between those (usually potential plaintiffs and their
lawyers) who favor leaving the resolution of disputes to juries,
and those (usually potential defendants and their lawyers) who
want trial judges to have maximum authority to control juries'
sympathetic impulse to award damages to injured parties.3
To reassure those who feared that the abandonment of Frye
would lead to a "'free-for-all' in which befuddled juries are con-
founded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions," 2
the Daubert Court looked beyond vigorous cross examination
and other devices of the adversary system and made clear that
trial judges must act as gatekeepers not only in deciding on the
admissibility of evidence, but also by directing verdicts or enter-
ing summary judgments when the scintilla of expert evidence
presented for a position is not enough to permit "a reasonable
juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true."'
(1993) (No. 92-102)).
31. This division emerges in a dialogue about Daubert between David M. Harney,
a plaintiffs' attorney from Los Angeles, and Raoul D. Kennedy, a defense lawyer from
Oakland, in the pages of the California Bar Association's journal shortly after the
decision. Brave New World, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Sept. 1993 at 31 (Richard C. Reuben
ed.). Kennedy insists that 'judges still have a gatekeeper function" though the
"grounds for admission of evidence are somewhat more flexible" than they had been
under Frye. Id. Harney, on the other hand, sees Daubert as a "big change" that is
consistent with his own philosophy-"let all the evidence in"-under which it is up to
"the jury [to] determine what effect it should be given" since the jury is the judge of
the facts and "opinion evidence becomes factual testimony in the sense that the jury
can adopt it as a fact. Judges are not juries, and judges should not keep out this
evidence." Id. at 34.
32. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
33. Id. Despite these observations about trial judges' roles in evaluating the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, Daubert "was primarily about admissibility," as the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in reversing the judgment
granted as a matter of law by a district court in favor of the defendant in a suit
brought by the widow of a sheet metal worker who died at age 40 of colon cancer
where a jury had found that the cancer was caused by his workplace exposure to an
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This creates an opposite danger, of course, that a judge's
screening role will promote a "stifling scientific orthodoxy" and
will prevent jurors from hearing about genuine insights and
valuable new findings. 4 Rather than gainsaying this risk, the
Court ascribed it to the very purpose of the Rules of Evidence,
which exist "not for the exhaustive search for cosmic under-
standing but for the particularized resolution of legal dis-
putes."" This underlines another difference between science
and the law: while science is advanced by an open and uninhib-
ited debate about, and testing of, competing hypotheses,
"[c]onjectures that are probably wrong are of little use ... in
the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judg-
ment.., about a particular set of events in the past."6
asbestos-containing product. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124,
1131 (2d Cir. 1995). The district court judge in that case had reviewed the plaintiffs
evidence in light of five "Sufficiency Criteria" for epidemiological studies drawn from
the work of noted epidemiologist A. Bradford Hill. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos
Litig., Maiorana v. United States Mineral Products Company, 827 F. Supp. 1014,
1037-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995). In so doing, the district
court failed to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
engaged in "independent assessments of the witnesses' conclusions and comparative
credibilities," thereby departing from the well-established rules for judicial rulings on
the sufficiency of the evidence. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d at
1133 (citing Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 367 (2d Cir. 1988)).
Yet in one of the cases cited by the Daubert Court to illustrate appropriate uses of
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law, Brock v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990), the Court of Appeals had found the plaintiffs
epidemiological evidence was insufficient to support a jury's finding that Bendectin
caused birth defects in plaintiffs child because it judged the risk ratios derived from
the evidence were too low once adjusted by confidence intervals. Id. at 312. Although
the Second Circuit characterized Brock as consistent with the general rule for judging
the sufficiency of evidence and concluded that Daubert "did not alter the traditional
sufficiency standard," Judge Cabranes acknowledges:
[Slufficiency poses unique difficulties for trial courts in toxic or carcino-
genic tort cases ... which hinge on competing interpretations of epidemi-
ological evidence. By its nature, epidemiology is ill-suited to lead a
factfinder toward definitive answers, dealing as it does in statistical prob-
abilities and the continual possibility of confounding causal factors.
In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d at 1133.
34. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
35. Id. at 2799.
36. Id. at 2798. The tension between Daubert's endorsement of the scientific
method and its rejection of "conjectures," can be seen in one lower court's attempt to
place hypotheses in context:
A hypothesis is synonymous with a theory. Consequently, any hypothesis
or theory is not a fact until it has been scientifically proven. Anyone who
has been trained in the scientific method realizes that a hypothesis is a
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Yet the Daubert Court's standard for when trial judges may-
and should-take cases involving science away from the jury
masks a second and less recognized issue of authority. The
unresolved value questions embedded in the Court's "scientific
validity" standard ought to have become unmistakable once the
Court recognized that trial judges would have to decide whether
statements would be "accepted as truths on good grounds" by
the "relevant scientific community."3" Particularly in those cas-
es where the battle of experts involves not just differing opin-
ions about the significance of mutually agreed scientific theories
but disagreement about methodology and theories themselves, a
second question becomes inescapable: how is the threshold of
scientific validity to be established? Is it to be established by a
process conducted by the normal methods of the scientific com-
munity or by a preliminary "trial" in the courtroom? In other
words, who is going to judge science, judges or scientists?"
scientist's educated speculation. . .. It is important to underscore again
that a court of law is not a scientific experiment. When a court of law
determines responsibility for human suffering and awards damages, it
must do so based upon reasonable evidence, not just speculation or hy-
pothesis.
Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 25 n.56 (D. Mass. 1995) (quoting
Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 393-394 (D. Kan. 1984)).
37. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795, 2797. One court has applied this standard in the
negative as a ground for exclusion, without specifying whether the judge's determina-
tion is to be based on a judicial assessment of the failure of the evidence to meet
the relevant standard or a judicial recognition of the assessment of the relevant scien-
tific community:
[W]e think the primary limitation on the judge's admissibility determi-
nations is that the judge should not exclude evidence simply because he
or she thinks that there is a flaw in the expert's investigative process
which renders the expert's conclusions incorrect. The judge should only
exclude evidence if the flaw is large enough that the expert lacks "good
grounds" for his or her conclusions.
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 746 (2nd Cir. 1993).
38. The fear that the effect of Daubert is to place that responsibility squarely
upon the shoulders of lay judges has prompted a number of states to retain Frye,
despite its limitations. "[A] courtroom is not a laboratory, and as such it is not the
place to conduct scientific experiments. If the scientific community considers a proce-
dure or process unreliable for its own purposes, then the procedure must be consid-
ered less reliable for courtroom use." Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993).
This view is far from unanimous, however; other states have asserted that the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence remains a legal question. "[I]n testing for the admissi-
bility of a particular type of scientific evidence, whatever the scientific 'voting' pattern
may be, the courts cannot in any event surrender to scientists the responsibility for
determining the reliability of that evidence." Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 329 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1995) (quoting United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir.
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The Court gives no explicit attention to this second "authori-
ty" question of judge-versus-scientist because it does not seem
to understand how contentious and value-laden its notion of
"scientific validity" is, as opposed to how Justice Blackmun
would have it: a mere description of some external reality that
can be drawn uncontroversially from dictionaries and the writ-
ings of philosophers of science. Yet the issues of why and exact-
ly how authority should be allocated between judges and "the
scientific community" seem at least as significant as the more
familiar authority issue of judge versus jury. Indeed, precisely
because it involves a less familiar problem, one that prior cases
and commentary have done less to illuminate, it seems a more
troubling question. Frye's effective reliance on publication as the
measure of peer review and hence of "general acceptance" may
have been "uncompromising," but the alternative, many-factored
test with which the Supreme Court has replaced it, opens the
door to a complex task for which judges have no necessary
preparation.39 This difficulty has not gone unnoticed in subse-
quent decisions, especially among state courts grappling with
the applicability of Daubert to state standards of admissibility.
Arizona's high court for example, in refusing to replace a Frye-
based standard, commented on the as yet amorphous and
1978)).
The decision in Daubert has done little to settle the issue, leaving the "long-
standing tension between the responsibility of judges to render independent judgments
and their necessary reliance on the specialized knowledge of others to do so ...
unresolved." Farrell, supra note 24 at 2187.
39. In declining to Daubertize its own standard (dubbed Kelly-Frye, after the Cali-
fornia case in which it followed Frye, People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24 (1976)), the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court suggested that scientists are the appropriate entities to make
decisions concerning reliability. "[I]t may be preferable to let admissibility questions
regarding new scientific techniques be settled by those persons most qualified to as-
sess their validity." People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 330 (Cal. 1994). The Ninth Circuit
panel handling the remand of Daubert was openly skeptical about the transition from
Frye. The court laments that "the judge's task under Frye was relatively simple: to
determine whether the method employed by the experts is generally accepted in the
scientific community," but the judge's responsibility under Daubert is "a far more
complex and daunting task," particularly when courts are faced with "matters at the
very cutting edge of scientific research, where fact meets theory and certainty dis-
solves into probability." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,
1316 (9th Cir. 1995). "Mindful of our position in the hierarchy of the federal judicia-
ry," the appellate court continued, "we take a deep breath and proceed with this
heady task." Id.; accord Cavallo v. Star Enterprises, 892 F. Supp 756, 761 (1995)
( 'he second part of the admissibility analysis [the relevance requirement] gives the
court a more familiar role to play.').
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indeterminant multi-factor analysis: "The nature of [the scientif-
ic-validity] requirement is currently unknown, may vary from
case to case, and is to be fashioned by trial judges using an
analytical framework as yet unspecified."" Similarly, a federal
district court observed, "[w]hether the Daubert analysis is ulti-
mately viewed as 'wise' law, or whether it promotes 'good' sci-
ence, must be answered at some time in the future."4
III. SCIENTIFIC VALUE JUDGMENTS
Judges' concern that they are ill-equipped for the task as-
signed them by Daubert cannot be brushed aside, any more
than one ought to be unconcerned that both the vagueness and
the unfamiliarity of the task will lead to inconsistent out-
comes.42 But the central point is that the Supreme Court gave
40. State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1183 (Ariz. 1993). The Second Circuit has set
forth a total of eight factors that district courts should analyze when conducting a
Daubert inquiry, including several not mentioned by the Supreme Court: (6) the rela-
tionship of the technique to methods which have been established to be reliable; (7)
the qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on the methodology; and (8)
the non-judicial uses to which the method has been put. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 742 (2d Cir. 1994). Other courts in other circuits have included
similar factors in their Daubert inquiries. See, e.g., Daubert, 43 F.3d 1311. The prolif-
eration of other factors may tend to give judges more discretion and potentially lead
to inconsistent outcomes.
41. Casey v. Ohio Medical Products, 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
The responsibilities of district courts under Daubert are indeed heavy
ones. The training of a judge is of course in law and not in medi-
cine .... A court's analysis of medical causation necessarily forces a
court to become as familiar as it can, with little or no scientific training,
to understand the medical and scientific concepts. The vocabulary alone
is daunting; and the danger of merely grabbing at words, and attaching
too much significance to them, is very real. The Daubert analysis also
requires courts to focus heavily on what has occurred in the past, rather
than what the future of medicine and science might be. And history has
frequently taught that the conventional scientific wisdom of one genera-
tion is later looked upon as shocking ignorance by future generations.
Id. at 1382-83.
42. The improbability that judges will rule consistently on the validity of scientific
theory is amply demonstrated by the number of multi-factor tests that have been
recommended by state high courts for carrying out this analysis. See, e.g., State v.
Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 203 (N.M. 1993) (Is the technique based upon well-recognized
scientific principle and is it capable of supporting opinions based upon reasonable
probability rather than conjecture?); State v. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d 370, 382 (N.C. 1984)
(Were visual aids used before the jury so that it was not asked "to sacrifice its inde-
pendence by accepting [the] scientific hypothesis on faith[?]"); State v. O'Key, 899
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no inkling that it was aware of the epistemological problem at
the heart of its new standard, and of the ramifications of that
problem, especially where the notion of "a relevant scientific
community" is nonsensical.
To make these concerns concrete, suppose that the evidence
originally proffered in Daubert and other Bendectin cases was
presented to a trial judge after the Court's decision. Assume
that the defendant objected to the admissibility of all or part of
this evidence under Daubert, and the court ordered a hearing
in limine to decide whether the evidence should be admitted.
How should the judge decide whether a particular method of
analyzing the results of the epidemiologic studies is "valid," or
just sophisticated nonsense?' If the findings in question have
not been formally submitted "to the scrutiny of the scientific
community," should the judge assemble a group of scientists to
review them? If scientists hold differing views about the meth-
ods used, how should a judge go about selecting these review-
ers, and what values should the judge tell them to apply in
making their own assessments of whether the evidence is "good
science"? Or are judges going to proceed on the quaint notion of
"value-free" science? Seen in this light, Justice Blackmun's
recitation of the familiar notion that what counts about science
is its methodology of testing hypotheses, and attempting to
disprove them, seems rather naive. The decision that any par-
P.2d 663 (Or. 1995) (listing at least 18 separate factors trial courts could consider in
exercising their gatekeeping role).
43. Daubert's four factor analysis itself does not provide a definitive means for
drawing the line between valid and invalid science. "Even were we to use Daubert's
reliability/scientific validity analysis, we would still be left with the problem posed by
Frye: precisely when 'in [the] twilight zone the evidential force of the [scientific] prin-
ciple must be recognized.'" Bible, 858 P.2d at 1183 (Ariz. 1993); see also State v.
Carter, 524 N.W.2d 763, 778 (Neb. 1994). Oregon's Supreme Court also likened this
task to navigating through the Twilight Zone:
'There is a fifth dimension beyond that which is known to man. It is a
dimension as vast as space and timeless as infinity. It is the middle
ground beyond light and shadow, between science and superstition. And
it lies between the pit of man's fears and the summit of his knowledge.
It is an area we call the Twilight Zone." (citation omitted) In determining
whether scientific evidence is admissible, the trial court is to make sure
that the decision by the trier of fact is based on scientific facts, not sci-
ence fiction.
O'Key, 899 P.2d at 678 n.20.
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ticular theory has been defeated or confirmed may well turn on
which types of evidence, and what degree of proof, one applies.
Writing for the Ninth Circuit on remand of Daubert, Judge
Kozinski repeatedly raises considerations that suggest the diffi-
culties facing the lower courts in applying the Supreme Court's
decision. For example, taking note of Justice Blackmun's men-
tion of "whether the known or potential rate of error is accept-
able"" as one consideration in deciding whether to admit sci-
entific expert testimony, Judge Kozinski observes that the fac-
tors recited by the Court "raise many questions, such as how do
we determine whether the rate of error is acceptable, and by
what standard?"45 Judge Kozinski goes on to point out that
two of the factors mentioned by the Supreme Court "would be
difficult or impossible to apply to the expert testimony in this
case," since most of it was reanalysis of data rather than the
sort of original research contemplated in the Court's description
of the scientific process.' "As to such derivative analytic work,
it makes little sense to ask whether the technique employed
'can be (and has been) tested,' . . or what its 'known or poten-
tial rate of error' might be."47
The epistemological problem is further illustrated by
Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,48 the only ver-
dict for a plaintiff in the Bendectin litigation thus far which
has survived appellate review. The Superior Court granted the
defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. because it concluded that
the testimony of the plaintiffs sole causation witness, Dr. Alan
Done, should not have been admitted. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred because
Dr. Done (who was also one of the eight witnesses offered by
the plaintiffs in Daubert) had provided a sufficient foundation
for his testimony even though he admitted that none of the
four categories of scientific evidence was probative about
Bendectin's teratogenic effects "when ... considered separately
from the others. The [trial] court focused on this fact and con-
cluded that if each type of data, viewed in isolation, was not
44. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1316 (citing Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797).
45. Id. at 1316 n.3.
46. Id. at 1317 n.4.
47. Id.
48. 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986).
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sufficient to prove that Bendectin caused birth defects, then all
of them taken together could not prove it either." 9 When the
Court of Appeals found this reasoning to be in error, was it
applying a legal standard of reasoning or was it finding that
Dr. Done had used a method of reasoning that qualifies as
"scientific"?"
A further illustration of this problem can be seen in the
usually ignored side of the plaintiffs' proffered evidence in
Daubert itself. The Supreme Court focused on the statistical
reanalysis of the epidemiological studies, but the plaintiffs were
also prepared to introduce three other types of evidence. Was
District Judge Gilliam wrong to exclude this evidence because
there was so much epidemiological evidence? To support his
conclusion, he quoted the D.C. Circuit's Richardson decision:
These three types of studies-chemical, in vitro, and in
vivo-cannot furnish a sufficient foundation for a conclusion
that Bendectin caused the birth defects at issue in this
case. Studies of this kind singly or in combination are not
capable of proving causation in human beings in the face of
the overwhelming body of contradictory epidemiological
evidence.51
Again, should this be taken as a judicial or scientific proposi-
tion? If scientific, should it be held to the very standards that
the Supreme Court articulated for expert testimony in Daubert?
That is, should one take this as a hypothesis-that strong evi-
dence of type A (no observable effect of X on the population)
renders useless evidence of other types (X does cause mutations
49. Id. at 1104.
50. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1133 (2d Cir.
1995) (stating that sufficiency assessments of causation evidence-in determining
whether to enter summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law-entail a review
of the sum total of epidemiological studies, while admissibility assessments entail a
review of each study (or piece of evidence) in isolation.) The Ninth Circuit in the
Daubert remand held that insufficient epidemiological evidence (i.e., evidence that
does not show that it is statistically more likely than not that Bendectin causes birth
defects) may be aggregated with "other evidence" to make an issue of causation.
Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1321. However, the court uses statistical re-analysis as the only
example of "other evidence," and does not mention either animal studies, chemical
structure, or clinical evidence as a similar supplement.
51. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 573 (quoting Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, 857
F.2d 823, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 218 (1989)).
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in cultured cells and animals)-and how would one test and
confirm or refute the hypothesis?52
Of course, the particular holding in Richardson may itself be
mooted by the Supreme Court's having opened the door to the
recalculated epidemiological evidence, but some variation of this
problem will present itself in every case involving scientific
disputes: what kind of judgment is involved in deciding that
one type of evidence is superior to another?53 On remand of
Daubert, the Ninth Circuit excluded the testimony of the plain-
tiffs experts without having to delve into this thorny problem
because it concluded that the evidence of plaintiffs witnesses
did not meet "the two principal ways the proponent of expert
testimony can show that the evidence satisfies the first prong of
52. Several recent cases demonstrate the potential contradictory outcomes among
courts when judges encounter scientific disagreement about methodologies or theories.
Whiting v Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 23 (D. Mass. 1995), expressly rejected
the contention of the plaintiffs expert witness that a "linear exposure" model of
exposure (instead of the more traditionally accepted "threshold" model) was applicable
to the causal link between nuclear radiation exposure and a form of leukemia. The
epidemiological evidence pointed to a possible correlation between radiation exposure
and leukemia in small children and older adults, but no correlation in adults in a
similar age range as the plaintiff.
In contrast, in Benedi v. McNel-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1384 (4th Cir.
1995), the court cited City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975 (4th Cir.
1987), for the proposition that expert testimony need not be based upon identical case
studies or epidemiological data in order to be admissible. (In City of Greenville, with
little epidemiological evidence available, the court allowed the plaintiffs expert to
testify to the fact that, because there was a correlation between asbestos-related dis-
eases and exposure to high levels of asbestos, low levels of asbestos exposure may
cause serious harm-an apparent endorsement of the linear, non-threshold model of
exposure.) Whiting and Benedi thus involve similar situations but opposite results re-
garding admissibility. Presumably, a model rejected in one instance should not be
accepted as "scientifically valid" in another simply because of a lack of data on the
relevant subject, especially given the view of many courts-asserted as a matter of
certainty-that the lack of epidemiological evidence is fatal to a plaintiffs case. "Re-
gardless of the particular articulation of the teratology community's methodology,
positive human epidemiologic studies are always required to reach a conclusion as to
whether a specific agent is teratogenic [causes birth defects] in humans." Wade-
Greaux v. Whitehall Lab., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1451 (D. St. Thomas & St. John 1994).
53. For example, competing forms of causation evidence were at issue in Hopkins
v. Dow Chemical Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1125 (1995) (plaintiffs expert witness allowed
to testify about his experience as a toxicologist, his review of medical records and
defendant's studies, and his general scientific knowledge of silicone's ability to
cause immune disorders as established by animal studies and biophysical data in the
absence of a solid body of human epidemiological data to review). See also In re Paoli
R.R. Yard Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Joint E. & S. Asbestos Litig.,
52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Rule 702," namely, that it grows out of pre-litigation research
and that it has been subjected to peer review.' Absent such a
showing, the experts were required to show some objective
source that could verify the validity and reliability of their
methodology, which they had failed to do.55 The court did not
mention whether the animal studies or chemical structure stud-
ies proffered would have a bearing on the epidemiologists' con-
clusions.56
In Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Laboratories,57  the district
court attempts to deal with this problem of comparative evi-
dence by falling back on a Frye-like analysis. In Wade-Greaux,
the plaintiff claimed that the chemicals found in Primatene
Mist were teratogens and caused her baby's birth defects. The
district court judge excluded all of the testimony proffered by
the plaintiffis experts on conclusive causation (including all of
the testimony of Dr. Alan K. Done, mentioned above) because
the experts: (1) had not followed the generally accepted method-
ology used by the scientific community of teratologists; (2) had
not subjected their methodology to peer review or publication;
(3) had not developed their testimony independent of the litiga-
tion, (4) did not possess the qualifications or stature in the
scientific community to proffer an opinion on general or specific
causation; and (5) relied too heavily on animal studies and case
reports (anecdotal human data), scientific techniques that the
court felt frequently lead to erroneous results." Except for the
54. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1318.
55. The court concluded that it was unnecessary to remand to the district court
to offer the plaintiffs' experts an opportunity to explain their methodology because
none of them had testified it was more likely than not that the plaintiffs' injuries
were caused by their mothers' ingesting Bendectin. Hence even if admissible, the
evidence scientifically failed the second prong of Rule 702-the requirement of "fit" or
relevancy-because under the substantive law of California something (here, ingesting
Bendectin) would have at least to double the probability of an event to be presented
to the finder of fact as a legal cause of that event. Id. at 1321.
56. See also Ambrosini v. Upjohn Co., Civ. A. No. 84-3483 (NHJ), Civ. A. No. 84-
3483 (NHJ), 1995 WL 637650 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 1995).
57. 874 F. Supp. 1441 (D. St. Thomas & St. John 1994).
58. Id. at 1478-82. It is noteworthy how easily courts dismiss case reports. For
example:
Such case reports are not reliable scientific evidence of causation, because
they simply describe reported phenomena without comparison to the rate
at which the phenomena occur in the general population or in a defined
control group; do not isolate and exclude potentially alternative causes;
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third rationale, all of these reasons can be traced back to a
"general acceptance" analysis grounded in Frye, with nothing
added by Daubert other than uncertainty as to whether the
judgment being made is essentially a description of what the
judge believes constitutes "good science," or what the parties
have established "the relevant scientific community" holds to be
good methodology.59
The problem with the latter is not only that it is very vague
but that it begins what could become an infinite regression: by
what methodology does the scientific community establish which
methodologies are scientifically sound? Is that methodology
established by the courts or by scientists themselves? The exis-
tence of this conundrum is central to the problem created by
the Court's approach in Daubert, because the Court there em-
phasized that the judicial function is limited to deciding wheth-
er the methods used to support the proffered evidence is scien-
tifically valid and does not extend to passing on the validity of
the conclusions reached by these methods. 0  Yet if the
and do not investigate or explain the mechanism of causation.
Casey v. Ohio Medical Products, 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1995). While not
surprising or counter-intuitive, such assertions by judges are nevertheless remarkable.
When a scientist proposes to testify about his or her conclusions based upon such
reports and a court declines to allow the testimony, is the court describing what it
takes to be the attitude of the scientific community toward such reports or is declar-
ing as a matter of law (based upon the court's own sense of the scientific process or
the judicial process?) that such evidence is too unreliable to be considered "scientific
knowledge" as the Court has defined that category for purposes of Rule 702?
59. Glaser v. Thompson Medical Co., 32 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1994), and In re Joint
E. & S. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995), are examples of cases in which
the judges raise questions about the basic scientific methodologies employed by expert
witnesses (for example, limited sample size and statistical significance evaluations)
which again emphasizes the complex role judges are being asked to play when they
have to pass on the methodology employed by scientific witnesses.
60. The problems are, of course, only increased when the validity of scientific
conclusions are at issue, as in regulation of environmental risks. Wendy Wagner has
recently argued that efforts to incorporate science into toxic risk regulation have been
confounded by scientists' and policymakers' unwillingness to set out clearly the re-
spective roles of science and policy in the promulgation of regulations, instead mask-
ing them as scientific decisions. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic
Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995). In particular, the number of
untestable assumptions that must be made in attempting to determine a "safe" or
"acceptable" level of human exposure argue against simply leaving the question to the
"scientific process" to obtain a value-free answer. See id. at 1619. For example, a
judgment about how to extrapolate high dose exposures of a potential toxin given to
an animal to acceptable levels for human consumption requires a number of decisions
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epistemological problem and its normative derivative (by what
authority is who deciding what constitutes "scientific knowl-
edge," scientist or judge?) inhere in establishing the method-
ology by which a methodology can be judged to either be scien-
tifically valid or invalid, then the purported limitation of the
subject under review does not remove the difficulty.
Indeed, suppose for a moment that the epidemiological re-
analyses did not exist but that the plaintiffs' laboratory experi-
menters and chemists contended that in their scientific circles
evidence of the type they had accumulated was considered supe-
rior to epidemiological studies? It is not far fetched that these
experts could hold such views for the very reason relied upon
by the plaintiffs' epidemiology experts in the Bendectin cases
namely that the original studies had sampling errors, clinical
evaluation biases, and other problems. For example, in a cohort
study, if one counts in the "exposed" group women who took
Bendectin at times in their pregnancy when limb formation was
not occurring, then the absence of adverse effects in their off-
spring would not provide any evidence that the drug does not
cause limb deformities. Thus, either a statistical reanalysis
(which placed these women into the "unexposed" category) or
use of chemical or biological studies or models would provide
superior evidence; the mere numbers of people included in the
Bendectin epidemiological studies should count for nought if the
studies employed flawed data. As the computer folks say, gar-
bage in, garbage out.
normally not considered scientific in nature. See id. at 1625-26. One instance of
"transcientific" decisionmaking in this example is the proper extrapolatory model to be
employed among a number of equally scientifically plausible scenarios. Id. at 1626.
Though each model has been arrived at through testing and experimentation, a selec-
tion among them must necessarily include factors such as the risk-aversion of the
decisionmaker. In fact, the necessity of experimentation to arrive at these models
often cloaks, in the final decision, the role of policy judgments in arriving at the risk
assessment, a fact not often recognized by lay persons (including judges). Id. at 1627.
The suggestion that judges would rely on science to establish the validity-and hence
the evidentiary reliability and admissibility-of proffered evidence could thus be seen
as another instance of the "science charade" through which value judgments are
cloaked as science so that judges, like the high agency officials whose actions Profes-
sor Wagner examines, can avoid being held accountable for their decisions.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps those who have heaped praise on Daubert may prove
right, and trial judges, with a little extra work, will gain
enough understanding about scientific methodology to make
decisions about expert witnesses that seem sensible to most
knowledgeable observers most of the time. That would not re-
move the underlying problems with the method by which the
Court assumes scientific validity will be determined, but it
could render such problems largely of theoretic concern. To
inform them in this process, the courts would be well-advised to
think of the peer-oriented processes that stand at the heart of
the scientific enterprise as much broader than merely editorial
peer review. But implementing Daubert in this fashion would
not only amount merely to a modest modification of Frye
(whereas the Court seemed to think it was formulating a sub-
stantially different rule), but would also do nothing to resolve
the problem of discovering what judgments "true peer review"
can offer about particular scientific testimony, particularly when
the dispute between the parties centers on their reliance on
different branches of science and no single relevant scientific
community exists with the authority, or perhaps even the abili-
ty, to address all the conflicting expert testimony proffered.
Of course, if, as seems likely, the courts read Daubert as
encouraging liberal allowance of testimony whenever there is
any well credentialed scientist who supports the theory, then
time-consuming minitrials will not be necessary, and judges will
avoid addressing the deeper questions of the value assumptions
in science raised here. Yet if that occurs, many who now are
pleased with Daubert will be disappointed to find that Justice
Blackmun's detailed parsing of the meaning of "scientific knowl-
edge" amounted to nothing more than "if a scientist supports it,
let it in."
Finally, if the problems that federal judges-and their col-
leagues in the states6"-are already experiencing in applying
61. See Chan, supra note 30 (contrasting editorial peer review with "true peer
review").
62. The state courts have been far from unanimous in embracing the test articu-
lated in Daubert. A minority of states have accepted Daubert's holding as well as
the application of its four-factor test. State v. Brooks, 643 A.2d 226 (Vt. 1993); State
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Daubert continue to vex the application of the requirements of
Rule 702, then some more direct way will have to be found to
grapple with the unacknowledged problems of meaning, value,
and authority that Daubert failed to resolve. Certainly the way
chosen by the House of Representatives in the Attorney Ac-
countability Act of 1995"3 is no solution to the problem. Sec-
tion 3 of the bill ("Honesty in Evidence") merely enshrines a
very conservative reading of the Daubert opinion in the lan-
guage of Rule 702, but does not address the conceptual or nor-
mative problems in determining what is "scientifically valid." '4
The only escape, such as it is, from the problem is frankly to
acknowledge the problem, and to use Daubert hearings as fo-
rums in which the witnesses address the underlying method-
ological assumptions upon which their scientific methodology
rests, and the judge at least becomes aware of the value as-
sumptions (such as degrees of certainty and measures of proba-
v. Streich, 658 A-2d 38 (Vt. 1995); State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993); State
v. Moore, 885 P.2d 457 (Mont. 1994); Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993);
State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192 (N.M. 1993); State v. OKey, 899 P.2d 663 (Or. 1995).
A few states have accepted the holding of Daubert without explicitly deciding what
type of analysis is required under their equivalent of Rule 702. Nelson v. State, 628
A.2d 69 (Del. 1993); State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482 (S.D. 1994). Meanwhile a num-
ber of states have found Daubert unpersuasive. See People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321,
331 (Cal. 1994) ("Daubert, which avoided the issue of Frye's 'merits,' presents no
justification for reconsidering that aspect of our holding in Kelly"); People v. Wesley,
633 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1994); State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993); Flanagan v.
State, 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993); State v. Dean, 523 N.W.2d 681 (Neb. 1994); State
v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43 (Wash. 1994).
63. H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The House approved the bill in
March 1995 and sent it to the Senate. 141 CoNG. REc. 83743 (daily ed. Mar. 9,
1995). The Senate has yet to act on the bill. See 1994 Bill Tracking H.R. 988, avail-
able in LEXIS, Legislative Library, Billtracking File (showing the only action on the
bill in the Senate was to place the bill on the Senate calendar on March 15, 1995).
64. Section 3(2) of H.R. 988 would add the following to the end of Rule 702:
(b) Adequate basis for opinion.-Testimony in the form of an opin-
ion by a witness that is based on scientific knowledge shall be inadmissi-
ble in evidence unless the court determines that such opinion-
(1) is scientifically valid and reliable;
(2) has a valid scientific connection to the fact it is offered to
prove; and
(3) is sufficiently reliable so that the probative value of such
evidence outweighs the dangers specified in Rule 403.
Subsection (c) provides that testimony that would otherwise be admissible should be
ruled inadmissible if the witness "is entitled to receive any compensation contingent
on the legal disposition of any claim with respect to which the testimony is offered,"
and subsection (d) makes subsection (b) inapplicable to criminal proceedings.
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bility) that are hidden in the arcane language of scientific dis-
course. In this way, the relative distribution of authority among
jury, judge, and scientist can become a matter of iterative ex-
amination by the courts, and provide a grounding on which the
Court at a later date could confront these issues head on, in-
formed by the thinking of those at the trial and intermediate
levels with repeated experience with the issues.
